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In  May  1975,  pursuant  to  House  Concurrent 
Resolution  133,  passed  in  March  1975,  the  Federal 
Reserve  began  to  set  and  disclose  in  Congressional 
hearings  that  were  held  four  times  a  year  money 
supply  growth  targets  for  the  four  quarters  immedi- 
ately  ahead.  Now,  under  the  Hawkins-Humphrey 
Act,  the  hearings  are  held  only  twice  a  year-Febru- 
ary  and  July.  In  July,  preliminary  targets  are  dis- 
closed  for  the  next  calendar  year.  Also  in  July,  and 
in  February  as  well,  the  targets  are  set  (or,  if desired, 
revised)  for  the  current  calendar  year. 
Initially,  May  1975,  plans  were  announced  to 
increase  what  was  then  the  basic  measure  of  the 
nation’s  supply  of  exchange  media  or  money,  Ml, 
between  5 and  7½  percent  per  year.  The  lower  end 
of  the  range  was  reduced  to  4½  percent  effective 
beginning  in  the  fourth  quarter  of  1975.  The  upper 
end  of  the  range  was  reduced  to  7  percent  effective 
the  following  quarter,  and  further  reduced  to  6½ 
percent  effective  in  the  summer  or  third  quarter  of 
1976. 
Early  1975  to  Late  1976:  Recovery  with  Declin- 
ing  Inflation  In  association  with  lowering  its 
sights,  the  Federal  Reserve  kept  Ml  growth  at  the 
bottom  or  below  the  planned  ranges  until  the  third 
quarter  of  1976.  During  the  year  and  a  half  from 
March  1975  through  the  third  quarter  of  1976,  mea- 
sured  between  the  same  quarters  from  one  year  to 
the  next,  Ml  growth  ranged  between  4.5  and  5.2 
percent.  (Later,  beginning  with  our  discussion  of 
events  from  late  1976  on,  M1B  is  used  to  measure 
the  nation’s  supply  of  exchange  media  or  money. 
Here,  it  suffices  to  note  that  its  growth  ranged  be- 
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tween  5.0  and  5.8  percent  during  the  earlier  period 
now  under  discussion.) 
In  retrospect,  the  economy  performed  exceptionally 
well  during  the  early  1975  to  late  1976  period. 
l  The  recession  that  began  late  in  1973  ended  in 
the  second  quarter  of  1975.  The  nation’s  out- 
put,  measured  by  constant  dollar  GNP,  in- 
creased  6.5  percent  between  the  second  quarter 
of  1975  and  the  second  quarter  of  1976  and  4.7 
percent  between  the  third  quarter  of  1975  and 
the  third  quarter  of  1976.  Unemployment  fell 
from  the  recession  peak  of  8.9  percent  in  May 
1975  to  7.7  percent  in  September  1976. 
l  Inflation,  measured  by  the  rise  in  the  GNP 
deflator  dropped  from  11.6  percent  in  the  four 
quarters  ending  with  the  first  quarter  of  1975 
to  4.8  percent  in  the  four  quarters  ending  with 
the  third  quarter  of  1976. 
Few  believed,  in  early  1975,  that  our  economy 
could  achieve  vigorous  recovery  of  production  from 
the  1973-1975  slide,  and  realize  a  substantial  decline 
in  unemployment,  if  money  growth  was  held  below 
6  percent  per  year.  And  not  many  persons  believed 
that  this  could  happen  while  at  the  same  time  the  rate 
of  inflation  fell  sharply.  Rather,  it  was  widely  be- 
lieved  that  money  growth  substantially  higher  than 
6 percent  per  year  was  essential  to  a  strong  recovery, 
and  that  a  strong  recovery  was  sure  to  prevent  infla- 
tion  from  falling  sharply.  However,  the  events  of 
1975-1976  contradicted  both  beliefs.  First,  vigorous 
recovery  of production  took  place  even  though  money 
growth  measured  over  12-month  periods  was  main- 
tained  near  the  economy’s  long  run  growth  potential, 
which  is  estimated  to  be  3½  to  4  percent  yearly. 
Second,  inflation  dropped  nearly  60  percent  together 
with  the  recovery  of  growth  of  constant  dollar  GNP. 
Recovery  The  recovery  of  1975-1976  was  made 
possible  by  (and  indeed  required)  the  erosion  and 
elimination  of  the  forces  that  caused  the  1973-1975 
recession.  The  recession  resulted  from  a  combination 
of  factors.  The  acceleration  of  domestic  inflation  be- 
ginning  in  1973,  the  quadrupling  of  imported  oil 
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1974,  and  the  cutback  of  fiscal  stimulus  in  1973  and 
the  first  half  of  1974  all  played  important  parts  in 
depressing  production  in  1973-1975.  The  sharp  de- 
celeration  of  money  growth  that  began  in  mid-1973 
and  was  speeded  up  in  the  second  half  of  1974  was 
another  contributing  factor.  All  of  these  forces  had 
eroded  or  were  eliminated  by  the  spring  of  1975. 
Their  erosion  and  elimination  acted  to  halt  the  decline 
in  the  nation’s  output.  The  recovery  was  then  able 
to  start. 
Beginning  in  the  spring  of  1975,  constant  dollar 
GNP  grew  strongly.  It  was  propelled  upward  by  the 
natural  resiliency  of  the  economy’s  private  sector,  a 
modest  boost  in  the  12-month  rate  of  money  growth 
from  the  low  reached  in  the  recession,  and  the  input 
in  1975  of  strong  incremental  fiscal  stimulus.  In- 
creased  money  growth  was  only  one  of  several  con- 
tributing  factors.  It  was  hardly  crucial.  However,  it 
was  crucial  that  the  sharp  decline  of  Ml  growth  that 
began  in  mid-1973  and  speeded  up  in  the  second  half 
of  1974  be  stopped,  and  that  the  12-month  rate  of 
Ml  growth  be  maintained  at  or  near  a  rate  commen- 
surate  with  the  economy’s  long  run  potential  to  in- 
crease  constant  dollar  GNP.  And  this  much  was 
done. 
The  Decline  of Inflation  There  remains  the  ques- 
tion  of  the  decline  of  the  rate  of  inflation  that  oc- 
curred  together  with  the  rise  of  constant  dollar  GNP 
and  the  corollary  fall  of  unemployment  in  1975  and 
1976.  Many  attribute  it  to  the  lagged  effects  of  the 
loosening  of  labor  and  other  input  markets  and  easing 
of  cost  pressures  that  accompanied  the  1973-1975 
recession,  including  the  leveling-off  of  imported  oil 
prices  after  the  spring  of  1974.  However,  the  reces- 
sion  and  leveling-off  of  imported  oil  prices  were  not 
unrelated  to  the  course  of  money  growth.  The  view 
that  we  hold  is  that  the  sharp  deceleration  of  the  rate 
of  growth  of  the  money  supply  that  began  in  mid- 
1973  and  continued  until  early-  1975  was  a  common 
cause  of  (1)  the  1973-1975  recession,  (2)  the 
leveling-off  of  imported  oil  prices  after  the  middle  of 
1974,  and  (3)  the  decline  of  the  rate  of  inflation  in 
1975-1976.  It  played  a crucial  role  in  the  slowing  of 
inflation. 
This  is  not  to  say  that  inflation  is  always  and 
everywhere  a  purely  monetary  phenomenon.  Cer- 
tainly,  in  periods  as  short  as  a  year  it  is  not.  Mea- 
sured  quarter  to  quarter,  over  four-quarter  periods, 
or  year  on  year,  and  even  over  longer  periods,  infla- 
tion  can  be  triggered  or  worsened  by  any  of  a  large 
number  of  events.  An  occasion  of  severe  inflation 
was  initiated  in  the  United  States  by  the  buying  spree 
that  followed  the  invasion  of  South  Korea  in  June 
1950.  A  temporary  inflationary  impact  was  given  by 
the  OPEC  oil  price  increases  of  late  1973  and  early 
1974  and  again  in  1979.  Because  of  the  influences  of 
such  shocks,  any  particular  rate  of  growth  of  the 
money  supply  is  not  related  with  mathematical  pre- 
cision  to  the  accompanying  or  following  rate  of  infla- 
tion.  But  it  is  a  basic  and  demonstrable  reality  that 
in  the  post-Korean  War  era  in  the  United  States  the 
rate  of  inflation  measured  over  four-quarter  periods, 
or  year  on  year,  and  over  longer  periods,  has  been 
profoundly  affected  by  the  rate  of  growth  of  the 
money  supply. 
However,  it  is  past  money  growth,  not  the  accom- 
panying  growth  of  the  money  supply,  that  matters 
most.  Changes  in  money  growth  can  change  the  rate 
of  growth  in  expenditures  on  assets  and  even  GNP 
goods  and  services  relatively  rapidly.  Rates  of  rise 
of  some  prices  (financial  and  other  asset  prices,  com- 
modity  prices,  and  prices  of  shelf  goods)  adjust 
quickly,  but  a  number  of  factors  combine  to  slow  the 
adjustment  of  the  rate  of  rise  of  prices  in  general. 
To  begin  with,  there  is  no  assurance  that  regulated 
prices,  including  rents  and  utilities,  will  be  allowed  to 
rise  quickly  and  commensurately  in  the  wake  of  an 
acceleration  of  money  growth  and  corollary  rise  in 
the  growth  of  spending  on  GNP  goods  and  services. 
Also,  it  is  a  sticky  problem  to  raise  prices  that  have 
been  advertised  or  “established”  such  as  tuition,  hotel 
room  rates,  brand-name  product  prices,  doctors’  fees, 
and  theater  ticket  prices.  In  the  event  of  declines  in 
the  growth  rates  of  the  money  supply  and  spending 
on  GNP  goods  and  services,  it  is  equally  sticky  to 
cancel  or  scale  down  planned  price  increases  of  ad- 
vertised  goods.  And  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  re- 
quests  for  increases  of  regulated  prices  will  be  with- 
drawn  quickly  in  such  case. 
Further,  price  adjustments  to  changes  in  economic 
conditions  often  are  delayed  by  agreements  reached 
in  the  past  under  different  conditions.  Wage  rates 
are  set  ahead  by  collective  bargaining  in  important 
economic  sectors.  Forward  contract  prices  are  the 
norm  in  the  provision  of  such  financial  services  as 
term  loans  and  insurance,  and  in  the  supply  of  di- 
verse  raw  materials  and  energy.  Price  and  wage 
increases  contracted  for  in  the  past  ordinarily  are  put 
into  effect  whether  new  conditions  warrant  scaling 
them  down,  or  up.  Finally,  the  post-1932  tradition 
of  using  monetary  and  fiscal  stimulus  to  end  reces- 
sions  acts  to  deter  adjusting  wage  and  price  demands 
downward  in  renegotiating  contracts  to  conform  to 
current  recession  conditions.  This  is  because,  in  the 
post-1932  tradition,  ongoing  declines  in  spending  or 
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soon  by  new  monetary  and  fiscal  stimulus. 
As  a  result  of  these  diverse  factors  it  takes  time 
for  changes  in  money  growth  to  change  the  rate  of 
rise  of  the  general  level  of  prices,  i.e.,  the  rate  of 
inflation.  However,  by  1975  and  1976,  enough  time 
had  elapsed  for  the  rate  of  inflation  to  substantially 
adjust  to  the  slowdown  of  money  growth  that  began 
in  mid-1973  and  continued  to  early  1975. 
Late  1976  to  October  1979:  Money  Growth  Ac- 
celerates  As  was  noted  in  discussing  events  from 
early  1975  to  late  1976,  during  the  year  and  a  half 
from  March  1975  through  the  third  quarter  of  1976, 
measured  between  the  same  quarters  from  one  year 
to  the  next,  Ml  growth  ranged  between  4.5  and  5.2 
percent.  Because  Ml  growth  was  kept  at  the  bottom 
of  the  Federal  Reserve’s  planned  ranges  for  Ml 
growth,  and  because  the  target  ranges  had  been  re- 
duced,  we  had  high  hopes  in  1976  that  inflation  would 
be  permanently  checked  and  that  another  recession 
could  be  avoided.  Unfortunately,  Ml  growth  was 
accelerated  sharply  beginning  in  the  fourth  quarter 
of  1976. 
Quarter-to-quarter  Ml  growth,  which  had  been 
kept  between  2.9  and  5.8  percent  per  year  and  aver- 
aged  4.4  percent  per  year  in  the  four  quarters  ending 
with  the  third  quarter  of  1976,  was  suddenly  in- 
creased  to  7  percent  per  year  in  the  fourth  quarter 
of  1976.  In  1977,  it  ranged  between  6 and  8.8  percent 
per  year  and  averaged  7.5  percent  per  year. 
The  story  is  virtually  the  same  for  M1B.  Quarter- 
to-quarter  M1B  growth  ranged  between  3.2  and  6.3 
percent  per  year  and  averaged  4.8  percent  per  year 
in  the  four  quarters  ending  with  the  third  quarter  of 
1976.  It  was  increased  to  7.6  percent  per  year  in  the 
fourth  quarter  of  1976.  In  1977,  it  was  allowed  to 
range  between  6.5  and  9.3  percent  per  year  and  aver- 
aged  7.9  percent  per  year. 
MlB  is one  of the  Federal  Reserve’s  two  new  mea- 
sures  of the  supply  of  exchange  media,  replacing  M 1. 
The  other  is  MlA.  The  two  series  were  first  pub- 
lished  in  February  1980.  They  were  constructed  to 
start  in  1959.  They  can  be  extended  back  in  time  by 
assuming  they  are  identical  to  the  old  Ml  series  in 
years  before  1959.  MlA  excludes  the  demand  de- 
posits  of  foreign  banks  and  official  institutions  in 
U.  S.  banks,  but  otherwise  is  identical  to  old  Ml. 
MlB  equals  MlA  plus  commercial  bank  ATS  ac- 
counts  and  checking  accounts  in  depository  institu- 
tions  other  than  commercial  banks.  (See  Glossary.) 
Reasonably  accurate  data  have  been  available  on 
ATS  accounts  and  checkable  accounts  in  depository 
institutions  other  than  commercial  banks  as  they 
grew.  Thus  it  is  legitimate  to  use  the  MlB  series 
for  years  before  1980,  when  the  series  was  first  pub- 
lished.  It  also  is  logically  correct  to  count  all  check- 
able  accounts  in  all  depository  institutions  as  ex- 
change  media.  Accordingly,  MlB  is  used  to  measure 
the  U.  S.  money  supply  in  this  article  from  here  on. 
MlB  growth  remained  high  in  1978  and  through 
the  summer  or  third  quarter  of  1979,  just  before  the 
October  6,  1979  change  in  the  Federal  Reserve’s 
focus  which  is  discussed  later.  Quarter-to-quarter 
MlB  growth  ranged  between  4.8  and  10.7  percent 
per  year  and  averaged  8.2  percent  per  year  during 
this  period. 
Charting  the  Year-on-Year  Relation  of  Inflation 
to  Money  Growth  In  the  wake  of  the  acceleration 
of  money  growth,  inflation,  which  had  been  checked 
and  reduced,  increased  again.  The  GNP  price  de- 
flator  increased  6.2  percent  in  the  four  quarters  end- 
ing  with  the  fourth  quarter  of  1977,  8.2  percent  in 
the  four  quarters  ending  with  the  fourth  quarter  of 
1978,  8.9  percent  in  the  four  quarters  ending  with 
the  fourth  quarter  of  1979,  and  9.6  percent  in  the  four 
quarters  ending  with  the  third  quarter  of  1980. 
The  1977-1980  record  confirms  the  evidence  ac- 
cumulated  since  the  Korean  War  ended.  Specifically, 
by  and  large  and  on  average,  the  four-quarter  rate  of 
inflation  follows  closely  the  rate  of money  growth  two 
years  earlier.  The  relation  of  the  four-quarter  rate  of 
inflation  to  the  four-quarter  rate  of  MlB  growth  two 
years  earlier  during  the  post-Korean  War  period  is 
mapped  in  Chart  1. 
The  chart  maps  percentage  increases,  measured 
between  the  same  calendar  quarters  from  one  year  to 
the  next,  in  the  GNP  deflator  and  MlB.  The  solid 
line  maps  the  percentage  rise  of  the  deflator;  the 
dashed  line  maps  MlB  percentage  growth.  To  cap- 
ture  the  lag  between  changes  in  money  growth  and 
changes  in  the  rate  of  inflation,  the  growth  of  MlB, 
which  is  represented  by the  height  of  any  point  on  the 
dashed  line,  refers  to  the  percentage  growth  that 
occurred  in  the  four  quarters  ending  two  years  earlier 
than  the  date  shown  directly  below  that  point  on  the 
horizontal  axis.  For  example,  the  height  of  the 
dashed  line  directly  above  the  first  quarter  of  1956 
on  the  horizontal  axis  shows  the  percentage  growth 
of  MlB  from  the  first  quarter  of  1953  to  the  first 
quarter  of  1954.  Unlike  this  lagged  mode  of  timing, 
the  rate  of  inflation,  which  is  represented  by  the 
height  of  any  point  on  the  solid  line,  refers  to  the 
percentage  change  in  the  GNP  deflator  in  the  four 
quarters  ending  in  the  quarter  indicated  by  the  date 
directly  below  this  point  on  the  horizontal  axis. 
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YEAR-TO-YEAR  PERCENT  CHANGES 
MEASURED  BETWEEN  THE  SAME  QUARTERS  FROM  ONE  YEAR  TO  THE  NEXT 
Inspection  of  the  solid  and  dashed  lines  mapped  in  Mathematically, 
Chart  1  shows  that,  measured  over  four-quarter 
periods,  percentage  increases  in  the  GNP  price  de- 
1)  the  percent  change  in  MlB 
flator  from  1956  to  the  third  quarter  of  1980,  closely 
+2)  the  percent  change  in  MlB’s  velocity 
track  percentage  increases  in  MlB  two  years  earlier. 
=3)  the  percent  change  in  the  dollar  value  of 
However,  this  visual  approximation  of  the  relation- 
GNP.l 
ship  of  inflation  to  money’  growth  in  the  U.  S.  since 
1956  captures  only  part  of  the  power  of  changes  in 
MlB  growth  to  change  the  GNP  rate  of  inflation. 
Only  the  part  that  is  centered  on  price  behavior  two 
years  after  the  change  in  MlB  growth  is  captured. 
The  Long-Run  Adjustment  Changes  in  the  dollar 
value  of the  economy’s  GNP  always  can  be  attributed 
to  changes  in  MlB  or  its  velocity  or  turnover  in 
relation  to  the  dollar  value  of  GNP.  This  proposition 
has  nothing  to  do  with  economics.  It  is  a  matter  of 
arithmetic.  As  a  useful  approximation,  the  percent- 
age  change  in  the  dollar  value  of  GNP  in  any  given 
time  period  can  be  expressed  as  the  sum  of  the  same 
period’s  percentage  changes  in  MlB  and  its  velocity. 
Because  percentage  changes.  in  velocity  can  vary 
from  period  to  period,  percentage  changes  in  MlB 
will  not  result  in  proportional  changes  in  the  dollar 
value  of  GNP  in  the  same  period,  except  by  accident. 
Thus,  a  crucial  question  is:  How  do  percentage 
changes  in  MlB’s  velocity  vary? 
Measured  from  one  quarter  to  the  next,  percentage 
changes  in  MlB’s  velocity  vary  substantially.  How- 
ever,  as  the  unit  of  time  used  to  group  the  data  is 
1 The  exact  relationship  is: 
(l+(the  percent  change  in  M1B/100)) 
x(l+(the  percent  in  MlB’s  velocity/100)) 
-1 
=the  percent  change  in  the  dollar  value  of 
GNP/100. 
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twelve  years  from  1956  to  1967,  on  average,  velocity 
increased  3.45  percent  measured  year  on  year.  In 
the  next  12  years,  from  1968  to  1979,  the  year-on- 
year  or  yearly  increase  of  velocity  averaged  2.97 
percent,  a  difference  of  less  than ½  percentage  point. 
Table  I  sets  forth  yearly  average  percentage 
changes  of- 
l  MlB’s  velocity  in  relation  to  the  dollar  value 
of  GNP, 
l  the  dollar  value  of  GNP,  and 
l  M1B 
for  eight  consecutive  nonoverlapping  3-year  periods 
in  the  post-Korean  War  era,  beginning  with  1956- 
1958  and  ending  with  1977-1979.  The  data  show 
that  in  the  post-Korean  War  period,  measured  as 
yearly  averages  for  3-year  periods,  percentage 
changes  in  velocity  have  been  fairly  stable.  Over  the 
full  twenty-four  years  from  1956  to  1979,  velocity 
increased,  on  average,  3.2  percent  per  year.  In  the 
eight  3-year  periods  into  which  1956-1979  divides, 
the  average  yearly  percentage  increase  in  velocity 
never  exceeded  4 percent  or  fell  below  1.62  percent,  a 
range  of  only  2.4  percentage  points.  Except  for  the 
1968-1970  period,  the  average  yearly  3-year  increase 
was  well  within  1 percentage  point  of  the  full  24-year 
period  average  rise.  In  1968-1970,  it  was  1.58  per- 
centage  points  below  the  full-period  average  rise. 
In  sharp  contrast  to  the  rate  of  rise  in  velocity,  3- 
year  percentage  changes  in  both  MlB  and  dollar 
spending  on  GNP  varied  considerably  in  the  1956- 
1979  period.  Measured  as  yearly  averages  for  3-year 
periods,  percentage  changes  in  MlB  ranged  from  a 
low  of  0.97  percent  to  a  high  of  7.81  percent,  or 
nearly  7 percentage  points,  and  changes  in  the  dollar 
value  of  GNP  ranged  between  4  and  11.58  percent, 
a  range  of  more  than  7½  percentage  points. 
Moreover,  grouped  in  the  3-year  periods  into 
which  1956-1979  divides,  there  is  no  relationship 
between  the  yearly  rate  of  rise  in  velocity  and  either 
the  yearly  rate  of  rise  in  MlB  or  the  year-on-year 
growth  of  the  dollar  value  of GNP.  However,  3-year 
average  yearly  percentage  changes  in  the  dollar  value 
of  GNP  closely  match  3-year  averages  of  yearly  per- 
centage  changes  in  MlB.  The  relationship  between 
the  two  is  depicted  in  Chart  2. 
For  each  3-year  period,  the  chart  relates  the  aver- 
age  yearly  percentage  growth  of  MlB,  which  is  mea- 
sured  on  the  horizontal  axis,  and  the  average  yearly 
percentage  rise  in  the  dollar  value  of  GNP,  which  is 
measured  on  the  vertical  axis.  The  chart  shows  that 
Table  I 
3-YEAR  YEARLY  AVERAGE  PERCENTAGE  CHANGES 
IN  VELOCITY,  NOMINAL  GNP  AND  MlB, 
NONOVERLAPPING  PERIODS 
1956-1979 
Yearly  average  percentage change in 
Period  Velocity  Nominal  GNP  M1B 
1956  to  1958  3.00  4.00  0.97 
1959  to  1961  3.90  5.27  1.32 
1962  to  1964  3.48  6.71  3.13 
1965  to  1967  3.41  7.81  4.25 
1968  to  1970  1.62  7.27  5.55 
1971  to  1973  2.74  9.98  7.04 
1974  to  1976  4.00  9.23  5.02 
1977  to  1979  3.56  11.58  7.81 
the  two  are  very  closely  related.  For  the  3-year 
periods  into  which  1956-1979  divides,  changes  in 
MlB  are  matched  by  nearly  proportional  concurrent 
changes  in- the  dollar  value  of  GNP.  As  a  conveni- 
ence,  the  least  squares  regression  equation  of  the 
3-year  average  yearly  percentage  change  in  the  dollar 
value  of  GNP  regressed  on  the  3-year  average  yearly 
percentage  change  in  MlB  is  drawn  in  the  chart,  and 
its  relevant  statistics  provided  below. 
Accelerations  in  the  growth  of  dollar  spending  on 
Chart  2 
ANNUAL  PERCENTAGE  CHANGE  OF  MlB 
AND  CURRENT  DOLLAR  GNP  FOR 
3-YEAR  NONOVERLAPPING  PERIODS, 
1956-79 
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rated  money  growth  can  result  in  faster  inflation, 
accelerated  output  growth,  or  some  combination  of 
the  two.  A  short-lived  increase  in  the  growth  of 
output  is  likely  in  the  short  run.  However,  over  the 
long  haul,  accelerated  money  growth  tends  to  be  fully 
dissipated  in  faster  inflation.  This  is  the  fundamental 
lesson  of  the  data. 
There  is  nothing  mysterious  about  this  conclusion. 
Money  facilitates  production  only  when  it  is  intro- 
duced  into  a  market.  Unlike  in  the  cases  of  labor 
and  material  input,  increases  in  the  input  of  money 
(in  full-fledged  money  economies  such  as  ours)  do 
not  increase  the  potential  to  produce.  In  the  long 
run,  measured  real  GNP  growth  is  neutral  with 
respect  to  money  growth.2  This  does  not  mean  living 
standards  are  unaffected  ;  via  inflation,  rapid  money 
growth  generates  deadweight  losses  in  real  GNP. 
Because  the  limits  on  production  cannot  be  changed 
by  changing  money  growth,  the  acceleration  of spend- 
ing  that  results  from  accelerating  money  growth  ulti- 
mately  is  registered  in  faster  inflation.  It  is  only  a 
question  of  how  long  it  takes. 
The  longer  term  relationships  between  money 
growth  rates  and  rates  of  constant  dollar  GNP 
growth  and  inflation  are  pictured  in  Chart  3.  The 
top  panel  of  Chart  3  relates  MlB  growth  to  the 
growth  of  constant  dollar  GNP;  the  lower  panel 
relates  MlB  growth  to  the  rate  of  rise  in  the  GNP 
deflator.  The  data  are  again  grouped  in  the  eight 
consecutive,  nonoverlapping  3-year  periods  that  com- 
prise  the  1956-1979  period. 
For  each  3-year  period,  the  top  panel  relates  the 
average  yearly  percentage  growth  of  MlB,  which  is 
measured  on  the  horizontal  axis,  to  the  average 
yearly  percentage  increase  in  constant  dollar  GNP, 
which  is  measured  on  the  vertical  axis.  The  lower 
panel  relates  average  yearly  MlB  percentage  growth, 
again  measured  on  the  horizontal  axis,  to  the  aver- 
age  yearly  percentage  increase  in  the  GNP  price 
deflator,  which  is  measured  on  the  vertical  axis.  The 
chart  shows  that  the  long-run  growth  of  constant 
dollar  GNP  or  output  is  essentially  independent  of 
the  rate  of  rise  in  MlB,  while  the  rate  of  inflation  is 
closely  related  to  MlB  growth.  Again  for  conve- 
nience,  regression  equations  fitting  rates  of  rise  of 
constant  dollar  GNP  and  the  GNP  deflator,  respec- 
tively,  to  MlB  growth  are  drawn  in  the  appropriate 
2 This  statement  is  valid  assuming  full  employment  only 
at  the  start  of  the  run.  It  need  not  be  assumed  at  points 
in  the  run.  What  happens  is  that  shortfalls  in  output 
growth  during  recessions  are  matched  by  output  growth 
above  full  employment  potential  growth  in  recovery 
periods. 
Chart  3 
ANNUAL  PERCENTAGE  CHANGE  OF  Ml  B 
AND  CONSTANT  DOLLAR  GNP  FOR 
3-YEAR  NONOVERLAPPING  PERIODS, 
1956-79 
ANNUAL  PERCENTAGE  CHANGE  OF  MlB 
AND  THE  GNP  DEFLATOR  FOR 
3-YEAR  NONOVERLAPPING  PERIODS. 
1956-79 
panels  of  Chart  3,  and  their  relevant  statistics  pro- 
vided  alongside. 
Finally,  because,  as  was  earlier  discussed,  the  rate 
of  inflation  changes  in  response  to  changes  in  money 
growth  only  with  a  lag,  which  in  the  post-Korean 
War  period  has  averaged  two  years,  we  also  have 
mapped,  in  Chart  4,  the  1956-1979  3-year  relation- 
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and  the  average  yearly  rate  of  rise  in  the  GNP  de- 
flator,  respectively,  against  earlier  average  year-on- 
year  MlB  growth.  This  evidence  confirms  that  in 
the  longer  run,  constant  dollar  GNP  growth  is  un- 
affected  by  MlB  growth.  It  also  confirms  that  the 
rate  of  inflation  is  powerfully  influenced  by  Ml  B 
growth,  and  that,  on  average,  changes  in  the  rate  of 
GNP  inflation  have  lagged  changes  in  MlB  growth 
by  about  two  years  in  the  post-Korean  War  period. 
In  view  of  the  evidence  described  and  discussed 
above,  it  was  a  dreadful  mistake  to  accelerate  money 
growth  beginning  in  October  1976.  The  question 
that  is  examined  next  is  why  the  Federal  Reserve 
did  this. 
Late  1976  to  Late  1979:  What  Went  Wrong 
The  acceleration  of  MlB  growth  that  began  in 
October  1976  and  led  inexorably  to  the  acceleration 
of  inflation,  and’  in  turn  to  the  recession  that  now 
afflicts the  economy,  does  not  appear  to  have  resulted 
from  a  deliberate  decision  to  accelerate  money 
growth.  The  Federal  Reserve’s  targets  for  money 
growth  were  not  raised  when  the  acceleration  began. 
They  were  not  raised  later.  What  happened  was  not 
planned  or  even  projected.  However,  given  the  Fed- 
eral  Reserve’s  policy,  it  was  a  predictable  event.  The 
acceleration  of  MlB  growth  that  began  in  October 
1976  was  the  predictable  corollary  of  the  Federal 
Reserve’s  deemphasizing  money  supply  control  and 
placing  more  emphasis  on  resisting  changes  in  inter- 
est  rates  beginning  around  April  1976. 
Federal  Reserve  monetary  policy  is  reviewed  and 
determined  roughly  once  a  month  by  the  System’s 
Open  Market  Committee.  The  Committee  is  com- 
prised  of  the  seven  members  of  the  Board  of  Gover- 
nors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System  and  five  of  the 
twelve  Reserve  Bank  presidents  who,  apart  from  the 
president  of the  New  York  Reserve  Bank,  who  serves 
as  a  permanent  Open  Market  Committee  member, 
serve  in  rotation.  At  its  monthly  or  near-monthly 
meetings,  the  Committee  sets  inter-meeting  or  im- 
mediate  targets  for  both  money  growth  and  the  Fed- 
eral  funds  rate  (see  Glossary).  These  targets  are 
used  to  guide  and  constrain  the  manager  of  the 
System’s  open  market  accounts  in  the  New  York 
Reserve  Bank  until  the  next  Open  Market  Com- 
mittee  meeting.  From  March  1975  through  March 
1976,  the  manager  usually  (12  out  of  13  times)  was 
directed  to  keep  per  year  money  growth  within  a 
band  2½  to  4 percentage  points  wide  and  the  Federal 
funds  rate  within  a  band  1 to  1¼  percentage  points 
wide. 
However,  beginning  in  April  1976,  the  Open 
Chart  4 
ANNUAL  PERCENTAGE  CHANGE  OF  Ml  B  LAGGED 
2 YEARS  AND  CONSTANT  DOLLAR  GNP 
FOR  3-YEAR  NONOVERLAPPING  PERIODS, 
1956-79 
ANNUAL  PERCENTAGE  CHANGE  OF  MlB 
LAGGED  2  YEARS  AND  THE  GNP  DEFLATOR 
FOR  3-YEAR  NONOVERLAPPING  PERIODS, 
Market  Committee  narrowed  the  band  in  which  the 
manager  was  instructed  to  keep  the  Federal  funds 
rate  and  widened  the  inter-meeting  target  range  for 
money  growth.  Thereby,  the  Committee  deempha- 
sized  control  of  the  money  supply  as  an  operating 
goal  and  increased  the  importance  of  resisting  inter- 
est  rate  movements.  Money  growth  subsequently 
14  ECONOMIC  REVIEW, JULY/AUGUST  1981 emerged  primarily  as  the  incidental  corollary  of  the 
Committee’s  Federal  funds  interest  rate  goals.  The 
pertinent  policy  record  is  presented  in  Table  II. 
The  results  of  this  mode  of  operating  proved  to  be 
unwelcome.  Strong  credit  demands  put  upward 
pressure  on  the  Federal  funds  rate  almost  contin- 
uously  from  April  1976  until  early  1980.  These  pres- 
sures  should  have  been  allowed  to  dissipate  by  keep- 
ing  money  growth  and  hence  spending  on  GNP  goods 
and  services  from  rising.  Instead,  they  were  fueled. 
Given  its  policy  of  resisting  short-term  changes  in 
interest  rates,  the  Federal  Reserve  was  obliged  to 
supply  banks  with  increasing  input  of  reserves.  This 
input  provided  the  base  for  accelerated  money  growth 
and  ultimately  resulted  in  faster  inflation  and  weak- 
ness  of the  dollar  on  foreign  exchange  markets.  With 
faster  inflation,  credit  demands  and  interest  rates  rose 
higher  and  higher.  The  Federal  funds  rate  climbed 
from  a  daily  average  of  4.82  percent  in  April  1976 
to  a  daily  average  of  10.29  percent  in  June  1979. 
In  the  summer  of  1979,  the  rise  of  interest  rates 
became  intolerably  difficult  to  contain  even  between 
Open  Market  Committee  meetings.  At  its  July  1979 
meeting,  the  Open  Market  Committee  set  the  inter- 
meeting  Federal  funds  rate  target  at  9¾  to 10½ 
percent.  However,  it  proved  necessary  to  raise  the 
upper  limit  to  10¾  percent  before  the  August  meet- 
ing.  At  its  August  meeting,  market  conditions  com- 
pelled  the  Committee  to  set  the  inter-meeting  Federal 
funds  rate  at  10¾ to  11¼  percent,  but  before  the 
September  meeting  it  became  necessary  to  raise  the 
upper  limit  to  11½  percent.  At  the  September  Open 
Market  Committee  meeting,  conditions  compelled 
still  another  boost  in  the  targeted  range  to  11¼  to 
11¾  percent.  By  the  end  of  September  it  was  clear, 
even  inside  the  Federal  Reserve,  that  interest  rates 
had  not  been  kept  from  rising  by  focusing  open  mar- 
ket  operations  on  keeping  them  from  rising,  and  sub- 
ordinating  control  of  money  growth  to  that  end.  A 
new  approach  was  needed. 
From  October  6,  1979  Until  November  1980  On 
October  6,  1979,  the  Open  Market  Committee  an- 
nounced  an  historic  change  in  the  object  and  method 
of  open  market  operations.  First,  control  of  the 
growth  of  the  monetary  aggregates  was  made  the 
primary  object.  Second,  to  achieve  better  control  of 
the  growth  of  the  monetary  aggregates,  the  Com- 
mittee  shifted  the  method  of  open  market  operations 
“to  an  approach  placing  emphasis  on  supplying  the 
volume  of  bank  reserves  estimated  to  be  consistent 
with  the  desired  rates  of  growth  in  monetary  aggre- 
gates,  while  permitting  much  greater  fluctuations  in 
the  Federal  funds  rate  than  heretofore.”  Immedi- 
ately,  the  Committee  instructed  the  Manager  of  the 
System’s  open  market  account  “to  restrain  expansion 
of  bank  reserves  to  a  pace  consistent  with  growth 
from  September  to  December  at  an  annual  rate  on 
the  order  of  4½  percent  in  Ml  . . . . provided  that  in 
the  period  before  the  next  regular  meeting  the  Fed- 
eral  funds  rate  remained  generally  within  a  range  of 
11½  to  15½  percent.” 
Table  II 
SPREAD  IN  PERCENTAGE  POINTS  OF  INTER-OPEN  MARKET  COMMITTEE  MEETING 
TARGET  RANGES  FOR  Ml  GROWTH  AND  THE  FEDERAL  FUNDS  RATE 
APRIL  1976  TO  SEPTEMBER  1979 
1976 
Funds rate  range 
1977  1978  1979 
Ml  growth  target  range 













.  .  .  .  0.75  0.50  (1)  .  .  .  .  4  5.0  (1) 
...  .75  .50  (2)  .  .  .  .  4  5.0  4 
...  1.00  .50  0.75  ...  4  4.0  4 
0.75  .75  .75  .75  4.0  4  4.5  5 
.75  .50  .50  .75  3.5  4  5.0  5 
.50  .50  .50  (1)  4.0  4  5.0  (1) 
1.00  .50  .25  .75  4.0  4  4.0  4 
.50  .50  .50  .50  4.0  5  4.0  4 
.75  .50  .50  .50  4.0  5  4.0  5 
.75  .50  .50  .  .  .  .  4.0  5  6.5  ... 
.75  .50  .25  ____  4.0  6  5.0  ... 
.75  .50  .75  .  .  .  .  4.0  6  4.0  ... 
1 No  meeting. 
2 No  range was  specified.  The Committee directed that  the  Federal  funds  rate  be  maintained 
“at  about the current level (10  percent).” 
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ings  since  October  6,  1979  display  policy  statements 
indicating  a  continuing  commitment  to  achieving 
close  control  of  the  growth  of  the  monetary  aggre- 
gates  and  considerable  willingness  to  allow  wide  fluc- 
tuations  in  the  Federal  funds  rate.  The  immediate 
or  inter-meeting  target  range  for  the  Federal  funds 
rate  has  been  at  least  4 percentage  points  wide  and  as 
much  as  8½  percentage  points  wide  in  the  period 
since  October  1979.  In  the  case  of  money  growth, 
the  immediate  target,  which  was  expressed  in  terms 
of  per  annum  growth  of  Ml  until  January  1980  and 
MlB  from  then  on,  was  specified- 
l  in  October  1979  as  “on  the  order  of  4½  per- 
cent”  for the  September-December  1979  period, 
l  in  November  1979  as  “about  5 percent”  for  the 
November-December  1979  period, 
l  in  January  1980  (there  was  no  December  1979 
meeting)  as  “between  4  and  5  percent”  over 
the  first  quarter  of  1980, 
l  in  February  1980  as  “(about  5 percent”  over  the 
first  quarter, 
l  in  March  and  April  1980  as  “5  percent  .  .  . or 
somewhat  less”  over  the  first  half  of  1980, 
l  in  May  1980  as  “7½  to  8  percent”  until  the 
next  meeting, 
l  in  July  1980  (there  was  no  June  meeting)  as 
“8  percent”  until  the  next  meeting,  except  that 
“in  view  of  the  shortfall  in  monetary  growth 
over  the  first  half  of  the  year,  moderately  faster 
growth  would  be  accepted  if  it  developed  in 
response  to  a  strengthening  in  the  public’s  de- 
mand  for  money  balances  (i.e.,  falling  velocity 
rates).  . . .”,  and 
l  in  August  1980  as  “9  percent”  until  the  next 
meeting. 
Unfortunately,  despite  the  Federal  Reserve’s  new 
willingness  to  let  the  Federal  funds  rate  fluctuate 
over  a  wide  range,  money  growth  has  not  been  sta- 
bilized  as  intended  since  October  6,  1979.  The  perti- 
nent  record  is  set  forth  in  Table  III.  It  shows  wide 
fluctuations  both  in  the  Federal  funds  rate  and  MlB 
growth  from  October  1979  until  November  1980. 
From  October  1979  to  October  1980,  per  year 
M1B  growth- 
(1)  was  allowed  to  fall  below  the  Federal  Re- 
serve’s  target  growth  range  in  November  1979, 
(2)  was  propelled  close  to  the  top  of  the  range 
in  February  1980, 
(3)  was  allowed  to  fall  sharply  below  it  in  the 
April-May  1980  period,  and  then 
(4)  was  propelled  near  the  top  again  in  August 
1980  and  over  it  in  October  1980. 
The  miss  in  the  April-May  1980  period  was  espe- 
cially  large  and  undoubtedly  exacerbated  the  reces- 
sion  that  began  in  January  1980.  The  extraordinary 
reacceleration  of  money  growth  since  May  1980,  por- 
tends  higher  inflation  and  another  recession  ahead. 
In  light  of  the  record,  it  is  difficult  to  know 
whether  to be  pessimistic  or  optimistic  about  the  Fed- 
eral  Reserve’s  actually  achieving  control  of  MlB 
growth  in  the  months  and  years  ahead.  Our  inclina- 
tion  at  this  time  is  to  wait  and  see. 
A  Reason  for  Optimism  Monetary  policy  should 
aim  in  the  years  ahead  at  reducing  MlB  growth  from 
the  nearly  8  percent  rate  of  this  (1980)  and  recent 
years  to  2½  to  3½  percent  per  year,  which  we  esti- 
mate  would  be  consistent  with  inflation  of  1 to  3 per- 
cent  per  year.  This  can  be  done  (1)  if,  upon  ob- 
serving  MlB  to  be  growing  faster  or  slower  than 
targeted  for  the  current  year,  corrective  action  is 
taken  and  this  year’s  target  is  hit,  and  (2)  if  the 
target  is  steadily  reduced  from  year  to  year  until  the 
desired  2½  to  3½  percent  range  is  reached.  The 
corrective  action  required  to  get  MlB  growth  back 
on  course  when  it  is  off  is  not  difficult  to  implement 
and  carry  out.  All  that  is  required  is  to  scale  open 
market  purchases  up  when  MlB  has  been  growing 
Table  III 
MONTHLY  AVERAGES  OF  THE  FEDERAL  FUNDS 
RATE  AND  PERCENT  PER  YEAR  GROWTH  OF  MlB 
OCTOBER  1979  TO  NOVEMBER  1980 
Date 
October  1979 
November  1979 
December 1979 
January  1980 
February  1980 
March  1980 
April  1980 
May  1980 
June  1980 
July  1980 
August  1980 
September  1980 
October  1980 
November  1980 
FFR  MlB  Growth 
13.77  2.20 
13.18  4.07 
13.78  6.87 
13.82  5.28 
14.13  9.89 
17.19  -.31 
17.61  -  14.11 
10.98  -1.24 
9.47  14.60 
9.03  11.05 
9.61  21.60 
10.87  15.84 
12.81  11.21 
15.59  .  .  .  . 
Note:  FFR is  the  interest  rate  on  Federal  funds,  monthly 
average.  MlB  growth  is  the  percent  per  year  rate  of 
rise  in  MlB. 
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fast,  and  to  persist  until  it  is  brought  back  on  track; 
if  one  scalar  doesn’t  work  another  will. 
The  saw-tooth  pattern  of  MlB  growth  from  Oc- 
tober  1979  to  October  1980  described  above  provides 
some  reason  for  believing  that  the  Federal  Reserve 
now  takes  its  announced  target  for  MIB  growth  seri- 
ously;  that  deviations  engender  responses  designed 
to  hit  it.  In  December  1979,  the  Federal  Reserve 
acted  promptly  to  accelerate  MlB  growth  because  it 
had  been  growing  too  slowly  in  the  October- 
November  1979  period.  In  March  1980,  actions  were 
taken  to  slow  money  growth  because  it  had  grown 
too  rapidly  in  the  December  1979-February  1980 
period.  As  a  result  of  these  actions,  MlB  growth 
was  stopped  completely  in  March  1980;  it  actually 
fell  $100  million.  The  following  month,  April  1980, 
it  fell  $4.6  billion.  Measured  from  September  1979, 
MlB  growth  moved  below  the  target  range,  in  April 
1980.  It  dropped  even  further  below  in  May  1980. 
Once  again,  the  Federal  Reserve  moved  to  change 
course.  By  June  1980,  MlB  was  again  growing 
rapidly  and  it  continued  to  grow  at  very  rapid  rates 
in  the  July-November  1980  period.  Now  there  are 
signs  that  the  Federal  Reserve  is  again  moving  to 
reduce  MlB  growth. 
In  summary,  since  October  1979,  MlB  growth  has 
not  been  allowed  to  careen  up  and  down  for  very 
long,  as  was  the  case  in  past  years,  and  most  recently 
from  October  1976.  to  September  1979.  This  pro- 
vides  a  reason  for  optimism. 
Reasons  for  Pessimism  We  would  be  more  opti- 
mistic  about  the  future  if  the  Federal  Reserve  com- 
pletely  stopped  trying  to  minimize  short-run  fluctu- 
ations  in  the  Federal  funds  rate,  and  revised  its  regu- 
lations  with  respect  to  the  assessment  of  reserve 
requirements.  Currently  the  assessment  is  delayed 
two  weeks  so  that  required  reserves  are  matched 
against  deposit  liabilities  of  two  weeks  ago. 
The  events  of  1980  show  the  damage  that  can  be 
done,  at  least  in  the  short  run,  by  the  combination  of 
lagged  reserve  accounting  and  the  setting  of  short- 
run  ceilings  and  floors,  no  matter  how  far  apart,  for 
the  Federal  funds  rate. 
Beginning  in  late  March  the  public  suddenly  and 
substantially  increased  its  demand  for  coin  and  cur- 
rency  vis-a-vis  demand  (checking)  accounts.  This 
was  not  an  accident.  Switching  from  checking  ac- 
counts  to  currency  was  impelled  by  the  higher  costs 
of  using  credit  cards  that  were  imposed  by  new  regu- 
lations  that  were  issued  by  the  Federal  Reserve  pur- 
suant  to  the  President’s  invoking  of  the  Credit  Con- 
trol  Act  of  1969  on  March  14,  1980.  Currency  and 
credit  cards  are  easily  and  commonly  used  in  dis- 
charging  on-the-spot  payments  obligations.  Check- 
ing  deposits  are  not  so  easily  or  commonly  used  for 
this  purpose.  As  a result,  deposits  were  drawn  down, 
and  banks  were  subjected  to  a  loss  of  reserves  which 
forced  a  sharp  contraction  of  the  money  stock-i.e., 
negative  money  growth  for  a  time.  MlB  fell  $6.6 
billion  from  the  four  weeks  ending  March  12,  1980 
to  the  four  weeks  ending  May  14,  1980,  or  at  an 
annual  rate  of  nearly  10  percent.3 
No  harm  would  have  resulted,  indeed  the  money 
supply  would  have  continued  to  grow,  if  the  Federal 
Reserve  had  made  open  market  purchases  in  suffi- 
cient  volume  to  replace  the  reserves  that  banks  lost 
at  this  time  because  of  the  currency  drain  that  re- 
sulted  from  the  higher  costs  of  using  credit  cards. 
But  until  late  May  the  Federal  Reserve  failed  to  re- 
place  the  reserves  that  were  drained  as  a  result  of  the 
imposition  of  credit  controls.  It  did  not  supply 
replacement  reserves  because  it  was  afraid  that  doing 
so  would  cause  the  Federal  funds  rate  to  fall  precip- 
a To  capture  the  impact  of  the  imposition  of  credit  con- 
trols  on  the  public’s  demand  for  coin  and  currency,  the 
4-week  moving  average  series  of  the  public’s  holdings  of 
coin  and  currency  measured  as  a  percent  of  its  checking 
deposits  (including  NOW  accounts  et  al.)  was  regressed 
on  an  internally  generated  time  scale  for  the  period  from 
the  twenty-seventh  week  of  1979  to  the  eleventh  week  of 
1980,  just  before  the  imposition  of  credit  controls,  and 
the  values  of  the  regression  equation’s  predictions  were 
compared  to  actual  4-week  moving  average  values  of  coin 
and  currency  expressed  as  a percent  of  checking  deposits. 
The  regression  equation  is- 
Coin  and  currency  as  a  percent  of  checking  deposits 
=37.347+.0280  time  scale 
(.037)(.0017) 
The  standard  error  of  the  regression  equation  is  .110 
percent.  data  are  seasonally  adjusted. 
Between  the  twenty-seventh  week  of  1979  and  the 
eleventh  week  of  1980,  just  before  credit  controls  were 
imposed,  the  value  of  the  regression  equation’s  prediction 
of  coin  and  currency  measured  as  a  percent  of  checking 
deposits  averaged  .02  percent  less  than  the  actual  value. 
The  two  were  never  more  than  .23  percent  apart.  In  the 
eleventh  week  of  1980,  the  predicted  value  was  .08  percent 
below  the  actual  value.  In  the  fifteenth  week,  four  weeks 
after  credit  controls  were  imposed,  the  predicted  value 
was  .19  percent  higher  than  the  actual  value.  In  subse- 
quent  weeks  the  gap  widened  to  .30  percent,  .46  percent, 
.86  percent,  1.06  percent,  1.18  percent,  and  1.22  percent. 
This  latter  is  more  than  eleven  times  larger  than  the 
regression’s  standard  error.  The  gap  then  drifted  down 
to  .85  percent,  still  nearly  eight  times  larger  than  the 
standard  error,  in  the  twenty-seventh  week  of  1980-i.e., 
about  the  same  time  that  credit  controls  were  relaxed  and 
eliminated.  By  the  thirty-seventh  week  of  1980,  the  pre- 
dicted  value  was  only  .02  percent  higher  than  the  actual 
value  and  since  then  it  has  fallen  below  the  actual  value. 
In  the  forty-fifth  week  it  was  .37  percent  less  than  the 
actual  value. 
The  results  strongly  support  the  contention  that  the 
imposition  of  credit  controls  caused  the  public  to  sud- 
denly  and  substantially  increase  its  demand  for  coin  and 
currency  relative  to  its  demand  for  check  money,  thereby 
paving  the  way  for  the  sharp  contraction  in  the  money 
supply  which  occurred  last  spring  (1980). 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  17 itously.  As  put  by  Federal  Reserve  Board  Governor, 
Emmet  J.  Rice,  in  a  New  York  City  speech  on 
May  7,  1980- 
With  the  aggregates  registering  growth  sub- 
stantially  below  their  target  ranges,  we  could,  of 
course,  increase  reserves  by  an  amount  sufficient 
to  bring  them  within  the  announced  target  ranges. 
However,  the  increment  in  reserves  necessary  to 
achieve  this  could  imply  a  federal  funds  rate  that 
is  far  lower  than  seems  prudent  under  present 
conditions. 
Such  a  provision  of  reserves  would  run  the  risk 
of  creating  too  much  liquidity  too  soon.  Moreover, 
it  might  be  interpreted  by  market  analysts  as 
indicating  an  abrupt  shift  by  the  Federal  Reserve 
towards  monetary  ease,  possibly  thereby  encour- 
aging  inflationary  expectations. 
Given  its  lagged  reserve  accounting  system,  the 
Federal  Reserve’s  fear  was  not  unfounded.  In  a  two- 
week  lagged  reserve  accounting  regime,  if  deposits 
fell  two  weeks  ago,  required  reserves  necessarily  must 
fall  this  week.  In  turn,  this  means  that  if  total  re- 
serves  are  increased  this  week  or  even  kept  un- 
changed  from  the  total  of  two  weeks  ago,  excess 
reserves  will  rise  and  cause  a  sharp  drop  in  the  Fed- 
eral  funds  rate.  The  banking  system  cannot  easily 
eliminate  excess  reserves,  but  most  banks  with  excess 
reserves  will  try  to  do  so.  Banks  with  excess  reserves 
sell  them  in  the  Federal  funds  market,  and  the  Fed- 
eral  funds  rate  tends  to  fall  with  these  sales. 
Because  the  Federal  Reserve  chose  to  put  a  floor 
under  the  Federal  funds  rate,  reserves  were  allowed 
to  fall  and  M1B  growth  became  negative  (-10  per- 
cent  per  year)  in  the  mid-March  to  May  1980  period. 
This  greatly  aggravated  the  recession  then  underway. 
It  need  not  have  happened.  It  wouldn’t  have  hap- 
pened  if  the  Federal  Reserve  had  not  put  a  floor 
under  the  Federal  funds  rate  at  the  time  and  focused 
on  controlling  MlB  growth. 
The  Federal  Reserve  also  continues  to  set  ceilings 
on  the  Federal  funds  rate  and  keeps  the  discount  rate 
below  market  interest  rates  when  market  rates  are 
rising.  In  combination  with  lagged  reserve  account- 
ing,  the  ceilings  often  produce  explosive  money 
growth.  This  is  because,  in  periods  when  the  econ- 
omy  and  deposits  are  growing,  the  Federal  Reserve, 
to  avoid  reserve  deficiencies  and  increases  in  interest 
rates,  provides  new  reserves  regardless  of  the  impli- 
cations  for  money  growth.  The  June-November  1980 
period  shows  that  explosive  money  growth  can  result 
if  this  is  done,  despite  the  best  intentions.  As  stated 
by  Federal  Reserve  Board  Governor,  Lyle  E.  Gram- 
ley,  in  a  Denver,  Colorado  speech  on  July  17,  1980- 
. . . during  the  earlier  phase  of  economic  recoveries, 
growth  in  supplies  of  money  and  credit  has  often 
begun  to  accelerate  because  the  Federal  Reserve 
did  not  let  credit  markets  tighten  sufficiently  while 
unemployment  and  excess  capacity  were  still  rela- 
tively  high.  That  is  the  mistake  we  must  be  par- 
ticularly  careful  to  avoid  when  the  current  reces- 
sion  bottoms  out  and  recovery  begins  again. 
The  record  shows  that  the  same  mistake  was  made 
again  this  year.  In  the  six  months  ending  in  No- 
vember  1980,  MlB  grew  at  an  annual  rate  of  15 per- 
cent,  the  highest  in  any  six-month  period  since  World 
War  II.  And  the  events  of  the  past  25  years  warn, 
in  turn,  that  explosive  money  growth  results  in  time 
in  the  acceleration  of  inflation,  elevation  of  the  Fed- 
eral  funds  rate  ceiling,  and  recession. 
Conclusion  Clearly,  it  would  help  in  the  manage- 
ment  of  M 1B  growth  if  the  Federal  Reserve  did  not 
subordinate  achievement  of  planned  MlB  growth  to 
minimizing  fluctuations  in  the  Federal  funds  rate  (or 
in  the  value  of  the  dollar  on  foreign  exchange  mar- 
kets)  even  for  a  week  or  a  day.  Widening  of  the 
Federal  funds  rate  control  band,  as  was  done  begin- 
ning  in  October  1979,  is  not  enough.  When  the  Fed- 
eral  funds  rate  is  bumping  the  top  of  the  control 
band,  it  doesn’t  matter  whether  the  interval  from  the 
top  of  the  band  to  the  bottom  is  one  percentage  point 
or  eight.  What  matters  is  that  the  Federal  funds  rate 
is  not  allowed  to  rise  any  further,  or  alternatively, 
pressure  on  the  Federal  funds  rate  is  relieved  by 
keeping  the  discount  rate  constant  and  the  discount 
window  open  wide.  As  a  result,  the  input  of  reserves, 
whether  through  open  market  purchases  or  discount- 
ing,  must  be  accelerated.  In  turn,  this  accelerates 
money  growth.  The  end  results  are  faster  inflation 
and,  ironically,  even  higher  interest  rates  than  would 
occur  if  there  were  no  Federal  funds  rate  control 
band  whatever. 
In  the  same  way,  when  the  Federal  funds  rate  is 
pressing  the  floor  of  the  control  band,  it  doesn’t 
matter  how  high  the  top  of  the  control  band  is.  Pre- 
venting  the  floor  from  being  broken  requires  slowing 
MlB  growth,  and  the  end  result  is  recession  and 
lower  interest  rates  than  would  occur  in  the  absence 
of  any  Federal  funds  rate  constraint. 
It  also  would  help  in  the  management  of  MlB 
growth  if  required  reserves  were  matched  against 
current  deposit  liabilities.  In  this  case  the  Federal 
Reserve  could  supply  or  withdraw  reserves  consistent 
with  achieving  its  money  growth  plans  without  hav- 
ing  to  worry  about  creating  excess  reserves  or  a 
reserve  deficiency,  and  thereby  providing  pressure 
for  sharp  changes  in  the  Federal  funds  rate.  The 
Report  from  which  this  article  is  extracted  empha- 
sizes  the  importance  of  achieving  close  continuing 
control  of  MlB  growth. 
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Money - Money  is  defined  conventionally,  as  the  dollar  quantity  of  exchange  media. 
Measures of  the  supply of  exchange  media: 
MI -  Ml  was  used  to  measure  the  supply  of  exchange  media  until  1980.  It  was  comprised  of  (1) 
checkable  (demand)  deposit  liabilities  of  commercial  banks  other  than  domestic  interbank  and 
U.  S.  Government  less  cash  items  in  the  process  of  collection  and  Federal  Reserve  float;  (2) 
foreign  demand  deposits  in  Federal  Reserve  Banks  ;  and  (3)  coin  and  currency  outside  the 
Treasury,  Federal  Reserve  Banks,  and  vaults  of  commercial  banks.  In  essence,  Ml  measured 
holdings  by  the  public  (other  than  commercial  banks),  and  by  state  and  local  governments,  and 
foreign  banks  and  official  institutions  of  demand  deposits  in  commercial  banks,  coin  and  cur- 
rency,  and  foreign  demand  deposits  in  Federal  Reserve  Banks. 
MIA - MlA  is  one  of  the  two  measures  which  the  Federal  Reserve  adopted  in  1980  to  replace  Ml 
in  measuring  the  supply  of  exchange  media.  MlA  equals  Ml  less  the  demand  deposits  of  for- 
eign  banks  and  official  institutions.  Through  1979,  year-to-year  percentage  changes  of  Ml  A 
tracked  those  of  Ml  except  in  1959  when,  following  the  restoration  of  convertibility  of  pounds 
and  francs  into  dollars,  there  was  a  large  input  of  demand  deposits  by  foreign  banks. 
M1B - MlB  is  the  other  measure  adopted  in  1980  to  replace  Ml.  MlB  equals  MlA  plus  auto- 
mated  transfer  service  and  negotiable  order  of  withdrawal  accounts  and  other  checkable  de- 
posits  in  depository  institutions,  including  commercial  banks,  credit  unions,  savings  and  loans, 
and  mutual  savings  banks. 
Federal  funds  rate-The  Federal  funds  rate  is  the  interest  rate  charged  on  inter-bank  loans.  Banks 
short  of  reserves  can  and  do  borrow  from  banks  with  excess  reserves.  Usually  the  loans  are 
repaid  the  next  business  day.  Because  the  funds  involved  are  deposits  in  Federal  Reserve 
Banks,  they  are  called  Federal  funds,  and  the  interest  rate  on  transactions  of  Federal  funds  is 
called  the  Federal  funds  rate. 
Monetary or  current dollar GNP - The  current  dollar  value  of  Gross  National  Product  is  the  eco- 
nomic  cost  of  producing  the  nation’s  output  in  a  given  year  plus  certain  adjustments. 
cifically,  it  equals  the  year’s  sum  of 
Spe- 
l  wages,  salaries  and  supplements, 
l corporate  profits  (before  taxes), 
l  rental  income, 
l  net  interest,  and 
l  proprietary  income; 
l  plus  business  transfers,  indirect  business  taxes,  subsidies  less  surpluses  accruing  to 
government  enterprises,  and  depreciation  allowances. 
Constant  dollar  or  real  GNP-Real  GNP  is  the  inflation-adjusted  or  deflated  value  of  current  dollar 
GNP. 
GNP  deflator-This  is  the  price  measure  used  in  this  article.  The  GNP  deflator  is  the  index  of 
the  prices  of  all  the  goods  and  services  that  make  up  the  Gross  National  Product.  It  is  used 
instead  of  the  Consumers’  Price  Index  because  it  measures  the  inflation  rate  for  domestically 
produced  goods  and  services. 
marginally. 
The  prices  of  imports,  including  oil,  affect  it  only  indirectly  and 
Using  the  GNP  deflator  allows  us  to  focus  on  inflation  born  and  bred  here  at 
home.  In  addition,  consistency  with  using  constant  dollar  GNP  to  measure  the  nation’s  pro- 
duction  or  output  requires  its  use. 
Velocity - Velocity  is  simply  the  dollar  value  of  GNP  divided  by  stock  of  money  however  defined. 
Every  monetary  aggregate  has  its  own  velocity.  MlB’s  velocity  equals  the  average  dollar  value 
of  GNP  in  a  given  period  divided  by  the  average  amount  of  MlB  outstanding  in  the  same 
period. 
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